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NOTE
WILSON v. GARCIA AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS: RETROACTIVE OR
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION?
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia' held that claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 invariably should be characterized as personal
injury actions for the purpose of identifying the state statute of limitations that should be borrowed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In establishing this ruling, however, the Court did not address the issue of
whether its holding should to be given retroactive effect, 2 where the cause
of action accrued prior to the Wilson decision and was either filed before
or after Wilson was decided, in reliance on a specific prescriptive period.
Part I of this Note examines the statute of limitations historically used in
section 1983 actions, analyzes the Wilson decision, and discusses the new
issues spawned by Wilson. Part II sets forth the retroactivity analysis
established by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.4 Part III
examines the lower federal court decisions since Wilson that exemplify
the confusion in the application of the Chevron analysis and concludes
that this confusion can be eliminated by the use of a more uniform approach to the Chevron retroactivity analysis.
1. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
2. The majority of courts have construed Wilson as silent on the retroactivity issue
and, therefore, a retroactivity analysis is required. See Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F.
Supp. 1402, 1406 n.7 (D. Minn. 1986); see, eg., Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334,
1338 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676);
Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1656
(1986); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
349 (1985); Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F. Supp. 461, 465 (D. Minn. 1985). The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, has determined that no retroactivity
analysis is needed. It reasoned that because the Supreme Court in Wilson upheld the
Tenth Circuit's application of its new ruling on a retroactive basis, the Wilson holding
implicitly mandates retroactivity. See Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir.
1985), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 2902 (1986). From this erroneous reading of Wilson, the
Sixth Circuit has adopted a blanket rule of retroactivity. See Jones v. Shankland, 800
F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cir. 1986).
The holdings of Mulligan and its progeny are erroneous because Wilson does not implicitly mandate a holding of retroactivity. Rather, the Court left the question for another day. Moreover, the Court, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967), and some
commentators, see, eg., Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the
Federal Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 907, 930-33 (1962) [hereinafter Prospective Overruling], suggest that the case or controversy requirement of article III of the Constitution may prohibit prospective application of a law-changing decision to the litigants presently before
the Court.
3. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), was decided on April 17, 1985. See infra
notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
4. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HISTORICALLY USED IN SECTION
ACTIONS

1983

A. Statute of Limitations Priorto Wilson v. Garcia
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 18711 provides a private individual
with a civil cause of action against any person who, under color of state
law, has deprived the litigant of a federal constitutional or statutory
right.6 Congress did not expressly provide a statute of limitations period
to govern claims brought under section 1983. 7 This omission, however,
is common in federal statutory law.8
Section 1988, 9 which governs section 1983 actions," ° provides some
5. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), § 1, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
6. See id.
7. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42,
48 (1984); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980); O'Sullivan v. Felix,
233 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1914).
8. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980). See, e.g., Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (no express federal statute of limitations provided for § 1981 claims); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 697-98
(1966) (no express federal statute of limitations provided for § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947) (no express federal
statute of limitations provided for the National Bank Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906) (no express federal statute of limitations for the Sherman Act).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). It states:
The jurisdiction ... conferred on the district courts [by the civil and criminal
Civil Rights Titles] for the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to
carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the
object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by
the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
(brackets not in original).
10. The Supreme Court has stated that Congress, by enacting section 1988, has implicitly endorsed the settled practice of adopting a local time limitation as federal law, if it
is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
267-69 (1985); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984); see, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704
(1966); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397-98
(1906); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S.
610, 617 (1895). See also Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old
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general guidance as to the procedural aspects of the federal Civil Rights
Acts."' While the language of section 1988 is murky,' 2 the Supreme
Court has interpreted section 1988 as mandating a "three step process." 13 First, courts are to look to the federal laws to the extent that
they carry the civil and criminal civil rights statutes into effect.' 4 Second, if no suitable federal rule exists, courts should apply state " 'common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes' of
the forum State."' 5 Finally, courts are to apply state law only if it is not
inconsistent with the federal Constitution and other federal laws. 6 This

last step asserts the supremacy of the federal interest.' 7 Wilson concerns

the second step 18 -"borrowing"' 9 or "adopting" 20 a state statute of limitations as federal law.
Prior to Wilson, the Supreme Court had instructed lower federal
courts to select the most "appropriate ' 2' or "analogous" 22 state statute
of limitations for section 1983 cases in accordance with the Court's interpretation of section 1988.23 The Court, however, provided the lower federal courts with little guidance to determine the "appropriate" or
"analogous" statute of limitations.2 4 As a result, the court of appeals
for
each circuit developed its own method. These methods can generally be
Light on Section 1988, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 601, 611-18 (1985); Special Project, Time Bars
in SpecializedFederalCommon Law: FederalRights of Action and State Statutes ofLimitations, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 1011, 1024-95 (1980); Note, Civil Right" Determining the
AppropriateStatute of Limitationsfor Section 1983 Claims, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 440,
441-42 & nf. 15-17 (1986) [hereinafter Appropriate Statute of Limitations]; Note, A Call
for Uniformity: Statutes of Limitation in FederalCivil Rights Actions, 26 Wayne L. Rev.
61, 64-70 (1979).
11. Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (D. Minn. 1986). See Burnett v.
Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984); Kreimer, supra note 10, at 612-13.
12. See Kreimer, supra note 10, at 613.
13. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-68 (1985) (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468
U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984)).
14. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984).
15. Id. at 48 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985).
19. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47 (1984); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980).
20. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
180 (1976).
21. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
22. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 49 (1984); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478, 488 (1980).
23. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S.
42, 49 (1984); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643
(10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Biehler, Limiting the Right to Sue: The Civil
Rights Dilemma, 33 Drake L. Rev. 1, 14 (1983); Jarmie, Selecting an Analogous State
Limitations Statute in Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts Claim" The Tenth Circuit'sResolution, 15 N.M.L. Rev. 11, 11-17 (1985); Appropriate Statute of Limitations,supra note
10, at 441-42.
24. Jarmie, supra note 23, at 15-16.
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categorized into two approaches: 25 characterizing section 1983 claims in
terms of the specific facts generating a particular suit,26 or applying a
more general characterization to all section 1983 actions regardless of the
discrete facts involved. 7
B.

Wilson v. Garcia

In 1985, the Supreme Court, 28 attempting to provide uniformity and
reduce collateral litigation, 29 held that the characterization of the section
1983 action, for the purpose of selecting a statute of limitations, is a question of federal not state law. 30 Further, the Court held that the best approach when characterizing section 1983 is to select the one most
appropriate state statute of limitations for all section 1983 claims.3 ' The
Court determined that the state statute of limitations for the "tort action
for the recovery
of damages for personal injuries is the best alternative
32
available."
Wilson eliminated some confusion over the appropriate statute of limitations since section 1983 plaintiffs no longer need to analogize their
claims to a particular type of action or theory and hope that their analysis is, in fact, correct.33 Wilson has, however, spawned new uncertainty
and voluminous litigation involving two issues. First, the decision calls
for each state to apply its limitations period for the "tort action for the
recovery of damages for personal injuries."31 4 Problems arise when a
state does not clearly provide such a limitations period, 5 or when a state
has more than one personal injury statute of limitations.36
25. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 648 (10th Cir. 1984) (concluding that, prior
to Wilson, there were two general approaches employed by the federal circuits for characterizing § 1983 actions), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); AppropriateStatute of Limitations,
supra note 10, at 442. See also Jarmie, supra note 23, at 26-36.
26. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
28. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985).
29. Id. at 275.
30. Id. at 268-71.
31. Id. at 271-75.
32. Id. at 276, 276-79.
33. See Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (1 th Cir. 1986); Smith v. City
of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 193 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Chris N. v.
Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (D. Minn. 1986). This has reduced the "excessive
resources heretofore expended by lawyers, clients, and courts in playing the § 1983 limitations guessing game." S. Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation, § 4.14, at
252 (2d ed. 1986).
34. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).
35. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Mismash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366, 1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Utah's
residual statute where there is no statute of limitations expressly applicable to actions for
injury to personal rights), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985); McKay v. Hammock, 730
F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Colorado's residual statute where there is no
statute of limitations expressly applicable to actions for injury to personal rights).
36. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See,
e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (different limita-

1986]

WILSON v. GARCIA AND RETROACTIVITY

367

The second issue, on which this Note will focus, concerns whether
Wilson should be given retroactive effect. 37 This issue can be divided into
two areas: first, where the cause of action accrued and was filed prior to
the Wilson decision,3 8 and second, where the cause of action accrued
tions periods for actions in trespass and trespass on the case), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 893
(1986); Rodriguez v. Chandler, 641 F. Supp. 1292, 1296-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (different
limitations periods for intentional and unintentional torts). This Note assumes that a
court has already found the appropriate statute of limitations and now addresses the
problem of whether Wilson should be given retroactive effect.
Other issues created by Wilson, which are beyond the scope of this Note, are whether
the decision also mandates that the personal injury statute of limitations be used in
§ 1981 claims, since that statute too, is subject to § 1988; and if so, whether Wilson is to
be applied retroactively. The courts are split here as well. Compare Nazaire v. Trans
World Airlines, 807 F.2d 1372, 1380 n.5 (7th Cir. 1986) (Wilson requires selection of the
personal injury statute of limitations for all § 1983 cases but permits selection of another
statute for § 1981 claims) and DiPasalgne v. Elby's Family Restaurants, Inc., 640 F.
Supp. 1312, 1314 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (same) with Banks v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel.
Co., 802 F.2d 1416, 1419-20 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (no distinction made between § 1981 and
§ 1983 claims where the relevant statute of limitations is at issue) and Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 1985) (same), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 568
(1986) and Weaver v. Gross, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1069, 1072 (D.D.C. 1986)
(same). On the issue of whether Wilson is to be given retroactive effect in § 1981 cases,
see Al-Khazraji v. St. Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 510-14 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 107
S. Ct. 62 (1986).
37. A retroactivity analysis is defined as a "process by which courts determine
whether a new judge-made rule of law should be applied to events arising before the new
law was promulgated." Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "AsApplied," 61 N.C.L. Rev. 745, 745 (1983).
For a thorough review of the conflict between retroactive and prospective application,
see Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal,61 Va. L Rev.
1557 (1975); Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Terra-Forvard The High Court. the
Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56 (1965); Ostrager,
Retroactivityand Prospectivityof Supreme Court ConstitutionalInterpretations,19 N.Y.L.
Forum 289 (1973); Schaefer, Prospective Overrulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1; Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due Proces" A Reply to Professor
Mishkin, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719 (1966); Traynor, Quo Vadis Prospective Overruling: A
Question of JudicialResponsibility, 28 Hastings L.J. 533 (1977); Note, Confusion in Federal Courts." Application of the Chevron Test in Retroactive -ProspectiveDecisions, 1985 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 117 [hereinafter Confusion in Federal Courts]; Comment, ProspectiveApplication of JudicialDecisions, 33 Ala. L. Rev. 463 (1982).
38. E.g., Pratt v. Thornburgh, 807 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1986); Loy v. Clamme, 804 F.2d
405 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1986); Small
v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986); Ridgway v. Wapello County, 795
F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1986); Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1986); Marks v.
Parra, 785 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1986); Farmer v. Cook, 782 F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1986);
Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494
(U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676); Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 2902 (1986); Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 1656 (1986); Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 1230 (1986); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1378 (1986); Fitzgerald v. Larson, 769 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1985); Jones v.
Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 893 (1986);
Bailey v. Faulkner, 765 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1985); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d
188 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 349 (1985); Knoll v. Springfield Township School
Dist., 763 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1985); Abbitt v. Franklin, 731 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1984);
Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1984); Carpenter v. City of Fort
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before Wilson but was filed after Wilson.39 The latter will be referred to
as "post-filed claims." The majority of the litigation concerns the former.' In both situations, the plaintiff had relied, by either acting or refraining from acting, on clear precedent as to the statute of limitations.
The problem that arises most frequently after Wilson, because the decision often mandates a shorter statute of limitations than that formerly
used,4 1 is that a plaintiff who had a timely claim before the decision is
now time-barred.4 2 For example, suppose a plaintiff relied on a five-year
statute of limitations. Suppose further that the new period mandated by
Wilson is two years. The plaintiff filed her claim in timely fashion, three
years after her cause of action accrued and before the Wilson decision
was announced.4 3 Should the new rule be applied retroactively, or
should it be given prospective effect? It is plain that retroactive application would bar the plaintiff even though she may have filed long before
Wayne, 637 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ind. 1986); John Does 1-100 v. Ninneman, 634 F. Supp.
341 (D. Minn. 1986); Ross v. Summers, 630 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Stewart v.
Russell, 628 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Hobson v. Brennan, 625 F. Supp. 459
(D.D.C. 1985); Johnson v. Amos, 624 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Greenfield v. District of Columbia, 623 F. Supp. 47 (D.D.C. 1985); Bynum v. City of Pittsburg, 622 F.
Supp. 196 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Gaus v. County of Wells, 620 F. Supp. 1462 (N.D. Ind.
1985); Fowler v. City of Louisville, 625 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Ky. 1985), aff'd without
opinion, 803 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1986); de Furgalski v. Siegel, 618 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. I11.
1985); Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1985); Snowden v. City
of Carbondale, 613 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D. Ill. 1985); Van Ryn v. County of Franklin, 614 F.
Supp. 400 (S.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd without opinion, 792 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1986); Moore v.
Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.
1986); Braderman v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 610 F. Supp. 1069 (M.D. Pa.
1985); Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176 (C.D. Ii. 1985); Scott v. City of Overland
Park, 595 F. Supp. 520 (D. Kan. 1984).
"Accrual" of a federal cause of action is a question of federal law. See Venegas v.
Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 779 (2d
Cir. 1977). In most of the cases discussed in this Note, accrual is when the tort occurred.
39. E.g., Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1986); Thompson v.
County of Rock, 648 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Wis. 1986); Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles,
644 F. Supp. 1352 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Sockman v. City of Erie, 645 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Pa.
1986); Photos v. Township High School Dist. No. 211, 639 F. Supp. 1050 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578 (D. Minn. 1986); Fasanelle v. Elrod,
635 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Arvidson v. City of Mankato, 635 F. Supp. 112 (D.
Minn. 1986); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Minn. 1986); Gamel v. City of
San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Young v. Biggers, 630 F. Supp. 590
(N.D. Miss. 1986); Wegrzyn v. Illinois Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 627 F. Supp.
636 (C.D. II1. 1986); Bailey v. Illinois, 622 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. I11.1985); Shorters v. City
of Chicago, 617 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
40. Compare supra note 38 with supra note 39.
41. See infra note 141. It is also possible that the new statute of limitations mandated
by Wilson is longer than that previously used. For example, where the old statute of
limitations was one year and the new statute of limitations is two years, the plaintiff is
often given the longer period in which to file suit. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. A seemingly "stale" cause of action may be revived if a court gives the plaintiff a
longer statute of limitations. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 142-43.
43. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The problem also arises in post-filed
claims. See supra note 39, and infra notes 159-89 and accompanying text.
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Wilson was decided. The Supreme Court has set forth the test for determining whether a rule should be applied prospectively in Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson, which is discussed in Part II.
II.
A.

RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson

The Supreme Court has recognized that "a legal system based on precedent has a built-in presumption of retroactivity."' " Thus, the general
rule is that judicial decisions apply retroactively."5 The Court, however,
as well as the lower federal courts, have carved out exceptions to the
general rule.4 6 These exceptions evolved, in part, 7 due to the injustice of
applying the new rule to litigants who acted or refrained from acting in
44. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 (1984); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507
(1973). Accord Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1986); Carpenter v.
City of Fort Wayne, 637 F. Supp. 889, 893 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634
F. Supp. 1402, 1405 (D. Minn. 1986).
45. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1973). See Confusion in Federal Courts,
supra note 37, at 124; see supra note 44.
46. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
87-88 (1982) (holding that the bankruptcy courts created by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
were unconstitutional, was to be given prospective effect); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, 106-09 (1971) (giving prospective effect to a prior holding that off-shore personal
injury cases were to be governed by the state statute of limitations of the contiguous
state); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (giving "line-up" reform cases prospective effect); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1965) (giving prospective effect to
the exclusionary rule as it applied to warrantless searches by state officers in violation of
the fourth amendment); Barina v. Gulf Trading and Transp. Co., 726 F.2d 560, 563-64
(9th Cir. 1984) (declining retroactive application of Supreme Court holding that claims
under 29 U.S.C. § 185 were to be governed by a six-month statute of limitations); Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1983) (same),
cer denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984); Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 444-46
(5th Cir. 1983) (prospectively applying the new rule of Supreme Court recognizing claims
for loss of society).
A number of courts have given Wilson prospective effect. See, e.g., Ridgway v.
Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 647-48 (8th Cir. 1986); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d
1334, 1338-40 (9th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No.
86-676); Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 654-55 (10th Cir. 1984) (companion case to Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985));
Abbitt v. Franklin, 731 F.2d 661, 664 (10th Cir. 1984) (companion case to Garcia v.
Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1413-14 (D. Minn. 1986); John Does 1-100 v. Ninneman, 634 F.
Supp. 341, 345 (D. Minn. 1986); Ross v. Summers, 630 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (N.D. Ind.
1986); Wegrzyn v. Illinois Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 627 F. Supp. 636, 640
(C.D. Ill. 1986); Bailey v. Illinois, 622 F. Supp. 504, 510 (N.D. I1. 1985); Bynum v. City
of Pittsburg, 622 F. Supp. 196, 198-99 (N.D. Cal. 1985); de Furgalski v. Siegel, 618 F.
Supp. 295, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F. Supp. 461, 466 (D.
Minn. 1985); Scott v. City of Overland Park, 595 F. Supp. 520, 525 (D. Kan. 1984)
(interpreting Garcia v. Wilson).
47. The other reason for the evolution of the doctrine of prospectivity was the desire
to maintain stability in past transactions that a judicially pronounced change in the law
would otherwise undermine. See Beytagh, supra note 37, at 1560; Fairchild, Limitation
of New Judge-MadeLaw to ProspectiveEffect Only. "ProspectireOvernlng"of "Sunbursting," 51 Marq. L. Rev. 254, 254-55 (1967).
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reliance on the old rule.48 Litigants should not be subjected to a new law
that could not have been known or anticipated when their claims arose.
In such cases, the party opposing retroactivity bears the burden of demonstrating that the decision should be given prospective effect.4 9
The Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson50 set forth three considerations for deciding whether to give a new rule prospective effect in a
federal civil" case. First, the federal court must determine whether the
decision establishes "a new principle of law, either by overruling clear
past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue
of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."" 2
Second, the court must "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by
looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect,

and whether retro[active] operation will further or retard its opera-

tion."53 Third, the court must determine whether retroactive application
could produce "substantial inequitable results" such that prospective application is necessary to avoid "injustice or hardship."5 4 These three
prongs of the Chevron test are sometimes referred to, respectively, as the
reliance, purpose and inequity factors. 5
48. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971); Moore v. Floro, 614
F. Supp. 328, 334 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986);
Levy, Realist Jurisprudenceand Prospective Overruling, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1960);
Mishkin, supra note 37, at 62-70; Prospective Overruling, supra note 2, at 910.
49. Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1405 (D. Minn. 1986); Moore v. Floro,
614 F. Supp. 328, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.
1986); Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176, 178-79 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
50. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
51. Depending on whether the context is civil or criminal, there are different retroactivity analyses. The criminal context is even more complex than the civil due to the
different standards for cases that are finalized, i.e., habeas corpus, and those that are on
direct review. The most recent case is Griffith v. Kentucky, 55 U.S.L.W. 4089 (U.S. Jan.
13, 1987) (Nos. 85-5221 and 85-5731), which seems to indicate a new direction in criminal retroactivity analysis. Griffith together with Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 58-59
(1985), reevaluated the standards set forth in United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562
(1982). Johnson clarified the standards set out earlier in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 637-40 (1965), as refined by Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). For a
complete discussion of retroactivity issues in criminal cases, see sources cited in supra
note 37.
In the civil context, Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), is viewed generally
as providing the appropriate retroactivity analysis. As Justice Blackmun wrote in the
context of a criminal case, "all questions of civil retroactivity continue to be governed by
the standard enunciated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson." United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 563 (1982) (citation omitted). This thought was recently reiterated in Griffith
v. Kentucky, 55 U.S.L.W. 4089, 4091 n.8 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (Nos. 85-5221 and 85-

5731).
52. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 106-07 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 107 (citation omitted).
55. Ridgway v. Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 647 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Confusion
in Federal Courts, supra note 37, at 123); see also Corr, supra note 37, at 747 (factors
labelled as purpose, reliance and effect factors).
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Application of Chevron

The Supreme Court in Chevron analyzed each factor independently
and concluded that each favored a prospective application of the new
rule.56 The Court did not explain whether or how to weigh each factor of
the Chevron test.5 7 As a result, lower federal courts have developed three
methods of weighing the Chevron factors: the balancing method, the
comprehensive method, and the threshold method.5 8
Courts that use the balancing method weigh the factors in different
ways. One method is to consider the number of factors that favor prospectivity.5 9 If at least two of the three favor prospectivity, then the new
rule is given such effect. Another method does not give the factors equal
6
weight so that one factor conceivably could outweigh the other two. 0
56. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-09 (1971). The Court refused to give
retroactive effect to Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), which
overruled federal precedent of using the general principles of maritime law. See Chevron,
404 U.S. at 107-09. Instead, Rodrigue directed that off-shore personal injury cases were
to be governed by the contiguous state's statute of limitations. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355.
The Court in Chevron was especially concerned with subjecting the plaintiff to a new rule
that he did not know or could not have anticipated when he filed his suit. Chevron, 404
U.S. at 107-08.
Since Chevron, however, in only one other civil case, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), did the Court address the question of retroactivity. In that case, the Court did not develop extensively the Chevron analysis. Id. at
87-88; see Confusion in Federal Courts, supra note 37, at 123-24. Rather, in a one paragraph analysis, it determined that each Chevron factor favored prospectivity. Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87-88.
In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986), although the majority did not
consider the question of retroactivity, the dissent used a Chevron analysis. Id. at 1304-06
(Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell examined each Chevron factor, determined that
each favored prospectivity, and thus found that retroactive application of Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), was not justified. Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1306-07
(Powell, J., dissenting).
57. It is anticipated that when the Court decides AI-Khazraji v. St. Francis College,
784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir.) (use of Wilson in analogous 42 U.S.C. § 1981 action and Chevron
analysis), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 62 (1986), and Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d
113 (3d Cir. 1985) (use of Wilson in § 1981 action), cert. granted, 107 S. C1. 568 (1986),
the lower courts will be provided with much needed direction as to the application of the
Chevron analysis. See supra note 36. See also Corr,supra note 37, at 763-81; Confusion
in Federal Courts, supra note 37, at 132-36.

58. See Confusion in Federal Courts, supra note 37, at 133-38.
59. See, e.g., Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (since reliance
factor favored prospectivity, and purpose and inequity factors favored retroactivity, the
court applied Wilson retroactively), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 1656 (1986); Bailey v. Illinois,
622 F. Supp. 504, 509-10 (N.D. I1l. 1985) (in dicta, court stated that reliance and inequity
factors favored prospectivity but did not discuss purpose factor). In Moore v. Floro, 614
F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986), the
court found that the reliance and inequity factors favored prospectivity but found the
purpose prong inconclusive. Id. at 332-34. Because the Moore court believed the correct
application of Chevron should be flexible, it determined that this conclusion did not prohibit a finding of prospectivity. Id at 333 n.7. Thus, the court concluded that even if the
purpose factor favored retroactivity, it would be greatly outweighed by the other two
factors. Id. at 334.
60. See, e.g., Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 446 n.14 (5th Cir. 1983)
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Courts that use a comprehensive test require that all three prongs of
the Chevron analysis favor prospectivity. 6' It has been noted that courts
may use this method because every time the Supreme Court has applied
Chevron, it has
found that each factor of the test pointed toward
62
prospectivity.
Courts that employ a threshold method use the first, or reliance, factor
as a condition precedent to prospective application.6 3 If the court finds
that the reliance factor favors prospectivity, then courts either balance
the second and third factors,' or balance all three. 65 Theoretically, if the
threshold is not crossed, courts should not consider the second and third
factors. Nevertheless, these factors are often considered,6 6 perhaps to
(noting that the purpose factor normally is given greater weight than the other two factors) (citing S/S Helena v. United States, 529 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1976)); Fernandez
v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 52 (Ist Cir. 1982) (although finding the reliance and purpose
factors favored retroactivity, the court stated that it could still hold prospectively if there
would be substantial inequitable results), aff'd sub nom. Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462
U.S. 650 (1983); Gamel v. City of San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(affording retroactive application because the inequity factor, which strongly favored retroactivity, outweighed the other two factors); Corr, supra note 37, at 766; Confusion in
FederalCourts, supra note 37, at 134.
61. See Confusion in FederalCourts, supra note 37, at 136. See, e.g., Smith v. City of
Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir.) (giving retroactive effect after considering all
three factors), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Carpenter v. City of Fort Wayne, 637
F. Supp. 889, 893 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must support prospective application in order to limit the retroactive effect of the decision.") (quoting NLRB
v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 757 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981)); Young v. Biggers, 630 F. Supp. 590, 591-93 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (court held retroactively after considering all three factors); Stewart v. Russell, 628 F. Supp. 1361, 1365
n.8 (S.D. Miss. 1986) ("[T]he court's duty is to weigh all Chevron factors in reaching a
result in accord with equity.") (emphasis in original).
62. See Confusion in Federal Courts, supra note 37, at 136.
63. See id. In a criminal case, Justice Blackmun pointed out in dicta that in civil
cases, courts usually apply a threshold test when performing Chevron retroactivity analyses. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 550 n.12 (1982). See also Chris N. v.
Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1414 (D. Minn. 1986) (noting that use of the first factor as
a threshold has become predominant). E.g., Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 996 (7th
Cir. 1973) (adopting in dicta a threshold test), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See infra notes 64 & 65.
64. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1980) (second and third factors should be balanced after finding that first factor favors prospectivity), aff'd, 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 580-81 (D.
Minn. 1986) (after determining that the first factor favored prospectivity, the court went
on to consider the other factors. Balancing the second factor, which it deemed inconclusive, against the third factor, where it found that plaintiff had slept on his rights, the
court held for retroactive application).
65. See, e.g., Ridgway v. Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1986) (after
finding the reliance factor favored prospectivity, the court balanced the inequity and reliance factors against the purpose factor); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. National
Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
954 (1981); Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 333 n.7 (N.D. I11. 1985) (same), aff'd
without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986).
66. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 627-28 (11th Cir. 1986) (even
though the court determined that plaintiff's reliance was unreasonable due to the lack of
precedential case law, it proceeded to consider the purpose and inequity factors); Wycoff
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provide an alternative foundation for the court's holding if the threshold
interpretation is not correct.67
The threshold test seems to have evolved from the structure of the
Chevron decision.6 8 Courts construing the retroactivity of Wilson often
determine that the reliance factor is the most important prong of the
test. 69 However, the Supreme Court cases from which the civil retroactivity theory has been largely drawn list the reliance factor second and
the purpose factor first.7 ° When the Supreme Court decided Chevron, it
inverted the order of the first two factors, placing reliance first. 7 ' Thus,
some courts and commentators have inferred that the reliance factor is
the most fundamental and should be used as a threshold. 2
If the main purpose of prospectivity is to prevent the injustice or hardship of retroactive application of a new rule of law to a litigant who relied
on clear past precedent, 73 the threshold method best furthers this goal.74
It ensures that a court will not afford prospective application unless, at a
v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 986-87 (8th Cir. 1985) (after determining that there was no
reliable clear past precedent, court proceeded to consider purpose and inequity factors),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1230 (1986); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194-96 (3d
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Snowden v. City of Carbondale, 613 F.
Supp. 1207, 1209 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (same); Braderman v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency,
610 F. Supp. 1069, 1071-72 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (same).
67. See Corr, supra note 37, at 765.
68. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 550 n.12 (1982); Corr, supra note 37,
at 769.
69. See, e-g., Pratt v. Thornburgh, 807 F.2d 355, 357 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The first consideration ... [is] the one primarily applicable here ....
); Farmer v. Cook, 782 F.2d
780, 781 (8th Cir. 1986) (the reliance interest is the most important factor); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (reliance factor is "[t]he first, and most fundamental, factor"), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1406 n.8 (D. Minn. 1986)
("The first Chevron factor is the most important factor.") (citing Wycoff v. Menke, 773
F.2d 983, 985-86 (8th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1230 (1986)).
70. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) ("The criteria guiding resolution of
the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of
the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration ofjustice of a retroactive application of the new standards."); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 637 (1965) (the Court speaks first of the purposes of the
overruling decision, then of the reliance by the litigants).
71. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971); Corr, supra note 37,
at 763-69. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 63-65 & 69 and accompanying text; Corr, supra note 37, at 769;
Confusion in Federal Courts,supra note 37, at 136-38.
73. Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 334 (N.D. I1. 1985) ("The touchstone of the
doctrine of [prospectivity] is the protection of litigants and lawyers, who have justifiably
relied on an old rule, from the unfair burden of an unexpected change in the law."), aff'd
without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986). Prospective application of a change in the
law is regarded as balancing the reliance of litigants against the necessity of responding to
changing values and needs of society. Note, A New FederalStatute of Limitationsfor
Section 301/Fair Representation Claims: Should It Have Retroactive Application?, 12
Fordham Urb. L.J. 591, 601 n.53 (1984). See also sources cited supra note 37 and infra
note 184.
74. Confusion in Federal Courts, supra note 37, at 137.
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minimum, clear and reliable past precedent was overruled.75
This Note endorses a type of threshold approach and, thus, supplies
analysis only for situations where there is clear past precedent. Where
there is no clear past precedent, there cannot be justifiable reliance and
the first factor favors retroactivity.7 6 Since there is no justifiable reliance,
there is no hardship to the litigant if the general presumption of retroactivity is followed.77 Although the threshold analysis ends here, even if
the other factors are considered, when the first factor favors retroactivity,
the other factors most often favor retroactivity as well.7"
III.

THE CHEVRON RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS APPLIED TO WILSON

A.

The First Chevron Prong: The Reliance Factor

The first Chevron factor, often construed as the most important, 79 requires a court to determine whether a new principle of law overrules
clear past precedent on which litigants could have relied or addresses an
"issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." 8 Although Chevron provides two alternatives, since the issue
decided in Wilson was not an issue of first impression, 8 ' the question of
75. See id.
76. E.g., Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1986); Smith v.
City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D. Minn. 1986); Young v. Biggers, 630 F.
Supp. 590, 592 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Braderman v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 610 F.
Supp. 1069, 1071 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
77. E.g., Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 627 (11 th Cir. 1986). See Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 581 (D. Minn. 1986).
78. This is the usual result due to the interrelationship between the reliance and inequity factors. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Larson, 769 F.2d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1985) ("In practice, this consideration [of the third factor] overlaps with that of the first factor .... );
Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he final factor of 'inequitable
result' is closely tied to the initial reliance factor."); Braderman v. Pennsylvania Hous.
Fin. Agency, 610 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (M.D. Pa. 1985) ("The third part of the Chevron
test often involves the same factors as the first part.").
In most cases, where the cause of action accrued and was filed before the law-changing
decision (i.e., Wilson) the first and third factors yield the same result. See infra note 137.
Therefore, where the claim is filed before Wilson was decided and the court determines
that there was no reliable past precedent, if the court applies a balancing test, two or the
three Chevron factors will militate toward retroactivity. See Fitzgerald,769 F.2d at 164
(the purpose factor militated neither in favor of nor against retroactive application, while
the reliance and inequity factors favored retroactivity); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764
F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 349 (1985); Braderman, 610 F.
Supp. at 1072 (same). If a court applies a comprehensive test, the purpose factor must
favor retroactivity as well. See Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 986-87 (8th Cir. 1985)
(court found all three factors favored retroactivity), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1230 (1986);
Snowden v. City of Carbondale, 613 F. Supp. 1207, 1209-10 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (same).
79. See supra note 69.
80. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
81. See Carpenter v. City of Fort Wayne, 637 F. Supp. 889, 893 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
("Because there is ample pre-Wilson authority on the appropriate statute of limitations
for § 1983 actions ... the 'issue of first impression' aspect of the analysis is irrelevant.")
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the retroactivity of Wilson concerns the first- overruling clear past precedent on which the litigants may have relied. Therefore, the first Chevron factor, the reliance factor, has three steps: 1) a new rule 2) that
clear past precedent 3) on which litigants could justifiably
overrules
82
rely.
The first step in the analysis of the reliance factor is to determine
whether the approach mandated by Wilson actually is novel."3 For all
circuits except the Fourth Circuit, which had already been applying a
uniform personal injury statute of limitations,84 Wilson represents a new
method of determining the proper statute of limitations.85
Second, the court must determine if and when there was clear past
precedent on which the litigants could rely. Defendants frequently argue that the court should examine the precedent nationwide, rather than
that within the circuit.86 This argument is unavailing" since it would
vitiate the first prong of the Chevron test.88 Using a nationwide examina(quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106); see also Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 986 (8th Cir.
1985) ("The issue had ... been addressed in virtually every circuit, and thus cannot
realistically be considered one of 'first impression.' ") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1230 (1986).
82. See Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194-95 (3d Cir.) (Wilson represented a new analytical approach, yet the old approach had produced no clear precedent
on which litigants could justifiably rely. Therefore, the first factor favored retroactivity.),
cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Young v. Biggers, 630 F. Supp. 590, 591-92 (N.D.
Miss. 1986) (same); see also Fitzgerald v. Larson, 769 F.2d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1985) (following the analysis as to the first prong in Smith).
In Chevron, the Court added to the reliance factor the requirement of novelty. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) ("[T]he decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law
...... ") (citation omitted); see Corr, supra note
37, at 763-66 (discussing the new requirement of novelty of the decision). Prior to Chevron, the novelty requirement had only been implicit in retroactivity analyses. Corr, supra
note 37, at 769; see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
83. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Corr, supra note 37, at 769
(Chevron established a novelty prerequisite).
84. See McCausland v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir.)
(West Virginia), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204
(4th Cir. 1972) (Virginia), cited with approval in, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278
(1985). But cf Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1092 (4th Cir. 1980) (using limitations period for liability created by statute in North Carolina).
85. Before April 17, 1985, the overwhelming majority of circuits did not use the approach mandated by Wilson-the selection of the personal injury statute of limitations to determine the "analogous" or "appropriate" statute of limitations for § 1983 claims.
See supra notes 21-27 and infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. By mandating that a
state's personal injury statute of limitations apply to § 1983 claims, Wilson clearly represents a new analytical approach. See supra note 82.
86. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 39-40, Saint Francis College v. AlKhazraji, 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir.) (No. 85-2169), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 62 (1986); Anton
v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1986).
87. Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1986) (court rejected nationwide approach). See Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 332-33 & nn.5 & 6 (N.D. Il1.
1985) (same), aff'd without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986).
88. Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 333 n.6 (N.D. I11.1985), aff'd without opinion,
801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986). This argument
taken to its logical extreme, would vitiate sub silentio the three-prong Chevron

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

tion, there could never be a finding of clear past precedent because the
Supreme Court often hears a case precisely because there is an intercircuit conflict.89 Therefore, since under a nationwide approach there
could never be a finding of clear past precedent, this factor would always
favor retroactivity.9"
Moreover, in Chevron, the Court focused on the precedent within the
Fifth Circuit directly affected by its prior holding.9 The lower courts
considering the retroactivity of Wilson have also concentrated on the precedent within the circuit prior to the Wilson decision, 92 and have not
acceded to defendants' requests for a nationwide examination. Thus, it is
clear that a determination of the precedent within the circuit is the most
logical approach. To determine whether the precedent within the circuit
was clear, the court must examine whether there was a uniform approach
for all section 1983 actions or a tort-specific approach.
Prior to Wilson, courts that used a uniform approach borrowed one
state statute of limitations as the analogous prescriptive period mandated
by section 1988 for all section 1983 actions within that state.9 3 This stat94
ute of limitations was usually either a "residual" statute of limitations
or a statute of limitations for "liability created or imposed by statute." 95
Oil test by mandating retroactivity whenever there is a difference of opinion
between any two federal courts of appeals. As a practical matter, because the
Supreme Court often weighs heavily the existence of a conflict among the lower
courts in granting certiorari, the potential for prospective-only ruling would be
dramatically diminished.
Id.
89. Id. For example, prior to Wilson there were at least two different approaches for
determining the appropriate statute of limitations. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 52, 80 & 82 and infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
91. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971). Even though the circuits
were in conflict as to which approach was correct prior to Wilson, litigants in a particular
circuit were entitled to rely on the law of that circuit. See Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp.
328, 332 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986). Cf
United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 177-81 (1984) (White, J., concurring)
(with respect to conflicts in the circuits, a decision in one circuit is not controlling on
litigants in another).
92. See Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Williams v.
City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626-27 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764
F.2d 188, 192-95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 349 (1985); Moore v. Floro, 614 F.
Supp. 328, 332 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986);
see also Al-Khazraji v. St. Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 511-13 (3d Cir.) (use of Wilson
in analogous 42 U.S.C. § 1981 action and Chevron analysis), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 62
(1986).
93. See infra notes 94 & 95.
94. Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 401 (8th Cir.) (affirming the district court's selection of the residual limitations period in Iowa), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); Beard v.
Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1977) (using the statute of limitations for "actions not otherwise provided for" in Illinois), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
95. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying the statute
of limitations for "liability created or imposed by statute"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000
(1982); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying the statute of
limitations for "liability created by statute").

1986]

WILSON v. GARCIA AND RETROACTIVITY

377

For these states, Wilson represents a new rule that overrules clear and
reliable past precedent.9 6 Thus, the first factor favors prospectivity.9 7
Where there was uniform precedent, the courts look less to the actual
litigants before the court, and instead infer statewide reliance by all plaintiffs who filed within the specified prescriptive period. 8 By contrast,
where there was no uniform approach, the litigant seeking prospective
96. For example, clear past precedent existed in California since 1962 when the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that the appropriate statute of limitations for
§ 1983 actions was the three-year limitations period for "liability created by statute."
Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Gibson v. United States,
781 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20,
1987) (No. 86-676). Similarly, in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, New
York's precedent was clear as to the use in § 1983 actions of the three-year statute of
limitations for "liability... created or imposed by statute." See Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); see also Saunders v. New York, 629 F. Supp. 1067, 1068 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
In the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the approach used since 1977 in Illinois was to borrow the five-year statute of limitations for "actions not otherwise provided
for." Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907
(1978); see also Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1142 (7th Cir. 1986).
97. E.g., Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1986); Gibson v. United
States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20,
1987) (No. 86-676). Despite the plethora of district court decisions, the Second Circuit
has not yet conclusively determined whether a one-year or a three-year statute of limitations is appropriate after Wilson. But see Villante v. Department of Corrections of New
York, 786 F.2d 516, 520 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986) (dicta stating that the three-year period would
be applied). The district courts that have chosen the one-year limitations period have
applied Wilson prospectively since the old period was three years. Kg., Nell v. Waring,
No. CV-79-0977, slip op. at 5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1986); Comfort v. Gorenflo, Civ. 84391T, slip op. at 3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1986). The majority of courts, however, apply the
three-year period for general tort claims, Rodriguez v. Chandler, 641 F. Supp. 1292, 1297
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), thus, the time limitation remains unchanged. See. e.g., Saunders v.
New York, 629 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Okure v. Owens, 625 F. Supp. 1568
(N.D.N.Y. 1986); Testa v. Gallagher, 621 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
98. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986) ("By directing courts to tie section 1983 actions to a different, shorter limitations provision, Wilson marks a clear break from settled circuit authority, potentially of great prejudice to
litigants who relied upon the earlier rule. Consideration of the first Cheron factor thus
militates against retroactivity."), cerL denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No.
86-676). Several district courts in California, when discussing the first Chevron prong,
cite Gibson, and perform little of their own analysis as to the particular litigant's reliance.
See, e.g., Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
("As explained in Gibson, the first Chevron factor counsels against retroactive application
... ."); Gamel v. City of San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("The first
two factors apply in the same way to the instant case as they did in Gibson. Clearly
Wilson establishes a rule different from the one previously in force in this circuit.").
There is a similar line of cases in the Seventh Circuit which puts little emphasis on the
particular parties, and more emphasis on litigants in general. See Anton v. Lehpamer,
787 F.2d 1141, 1144 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Wilson explicitly mandated that a different statute
of limitations is the most analogous; it overruled clear past precedent upon which litigants were entitled to rely when they filed a section 1983 action in Illinois."); see. e.g.,
Walker v. Day, No. 85-C-7520, slip op. at 2 (N.D. I11.July 14, 1986) (applying the Anton
formula to the facts of the case, see infra notes 167-83 and accompanying text, without
examining whether the particular plaintiff relied on the old statute of limitations); Photos
v. Township High School Dist. No. 211, 639 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (N.D. II!. 1986) (same);
Benegas v. Cardin, No. 85-C-8492, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Il. May 29, 1986) (same); Alvarez
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application has a more difficult task of showing reliance.9 9
Courts that did not use the uniform approach before Wilson generally
used a "tort-specific" approach.°" These courts characterized the action
in terms of the specific facts generating the suit and borrowed the analogous state tort action's statute of limitations. The existence of clear past
precedent for the purposes of the reliance factor, therefore, may depend
on the particular tort alleged. 10
A conclusion that can be drawn from a line of cases interpreting Wilson in the Fifth Circuit'0 2 is that if the prior practice was a tort-specific
approach, the court must consider carefully each case before it, charac-

terize the claim involved, and then determine if the precedent for that
particular state tort action was clear. Thus, compared to those situations
where a uniform approach was used, it is more difficult to discern a cirof Wilson when
cuit-wide rule of retroactive or prospective application
03
there was prior use of a tort-specific approach.1
In the final step of its analysis of the first prong, a court, having determined that there was clear past precedent as of a certain date, must consider when the cause of action accrued to determine whether the plaintiff
justifiably relied on the precedent." ° At this point in the analysis, courts
v. City of Chicago, 633 F. Supp. 1361, 1362-63 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (same); Hobbs v. White,
No. 85-C-7997, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 1986).
99. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626-27 (11th Cir. 1986);
Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194-95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 349
(1985); Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 579-80 (D. Minn. 1986); Young v.
Biggers, 630 F. Supp. 590, 591 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Stewart v. Russell, 628 F. Supp. 1361,
1364 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
101. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that while Wilson
represented a new rule, Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916, 918 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1378 (1986), there was no clear past precedent for an employment discharge
case. See id. at 919. Therefore, the court applied the one-year limitations period mandated by Wilson retroactively. See id. at 920. The next year, the Southern District of
Mississippi, in a police neglect case, Stewart v. Russell, 628 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D. Miss.
1986), found that there was in fact an overruling of clear past precedent, id. at 1364, as
well as a clear break from the old analytical approach. Id. at 1364-65. In Stewart, the
plaintiff justifiably relied upon precedent that called for a six-year statute of limitations
for all § 1983 actions against law enforcement officials. Id. at 1364. Therefore, since the
precedent was clear, the court found that this factor militated in favor of prospectivity.
Id. at 1364-65.
102. See supra note 101.
103. See Stewart v. Russell, 628 F. Supp. 1361, 1362 (S.D. Miss. 1986) ("Utilizing a
case-by-case analysis which this court deems both fair and appropriate under Chevron,"
the court concluded that Wilson should not be given retroactive application); see also
Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1406 (D. Minn. 1986) ("The [c]ourt concludes
that rather than establishing a blanket rule of retroactivity applicable to all cases
throughout the Eighth Circuit, Wycoff and progeny establish a more limited precedent
applicable to a specific category of cases.") (quoting Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1230 (1986)).
104. See Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 580 (D. Minn. 1986) ("In
analyzing the plaintiff's reliance ... the court should consider not only the date that his
case accrued, but also the date upon which he filed his suit."); see also Pratt v. Thornburgh, 807 F.2d 355, 357-59 (3d Cir. 1986) (determining when the plaintiff's cause of
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often distinguish between those claims filed before Wilson and those filed
after Wilson.' 0 5 For example, in a post-filed claim, where a plaintiff's
cause of action arose before Wilson but was filed after Wilson was decided, the plaintiff is sometimes held to the new statute of limitations
period mandated by Wilson if it was possible to file a claim within the
new period. 10 6 Courts reason that the plaintiff should have been aware of
the change of law and thus, should have filed immediately so as not to
appear to be sleeping on her rights.° 7 Where it was not possible to file a
claim within the new period, courts should give a reasonable period after
the Wilson decision to file the claim. 0 8
Where the plaintiff's cause of action was filed before Wilson was decided, courts are less inclined to hold the plaintiff to the new statute of
limitations mandated by Wilson because the claim was filed in compliance with the applicable law at the time her cause of action accrued.1" 9
action accrued and when she would have been justified in relying on precedent); Ridgway
v. Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 647-48 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 195 (3d Cir.) (same), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Sockman v.
City of Erie, 645 F. Supp. 52, 54 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (same); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F.
Supp. 1402, 1407-08 (D. Minn. 1986) (same).
105. See, eg., Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (C.D. Cal.
1986) ("This case raises the open question of how Wilson should apply to claims that
accrued prior to, but were filed after the date Wilson was decided.") (footnote omitted);
Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 581 (D. Minn. 1986) ("In the instant case,
plaintiff did not file until ... almost nine months following Wilson .... ); Gamel v. City
of San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (court distinguished this case
from previous Ninth Circuit decision that involved pre- Wilson filing). See also supra note
39 and accompanying text.
106. See Sockman v. City of Erie, 645 F. Supp. 52, 54-55 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (applying
new statute of limitations retroactively since plaintiff had at least nine months within
which to fie his complaint in compliance with the new two-year period mandated by
Wilson); Gamel v. City of San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("Wilson
was decided.., almost eight months before the action would become time barred under a
one year statute of limitations.... Gamel had ample time to file an action within the new
time limit.").
107. See Sockman v. City of Erie, 645 F. Supp. 52, 55 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (plaintiff must
take note of the new limitations period and file suit in a timely fashion); Richard H. v.
Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 580, 581 (D. Minn. 1986) (plaintiff cannot simply disregard overruling of precedent but rather, must file suit within reasonable period).
108. See, e.g., Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1986); Cabrales v.
County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Richard H. v. Clay
County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 580 (D. Minn. 1986); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp.
1402, 1413 (D. Minn. 1986); Gamel v. City of San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D.
Cal. 1986); Wegrzyn v. Illinois Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 627 F. Supp. 636,
640-41 (C.D. Ill. 1986); Shorters v. City of Chicago, 617 F. Supp. 661, 668 (N.D. Ill.
1985). But see Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 628 (11th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff
filed two months after Wilson but was not granted reasonable grace period); Arvidson v.
City of Mankato, 635 F. Supp. 112, 113 (D. Minn. 1986) (plaintiff filed three months after
Wilson but was not given reasonable period). For a further discussion of the difference
between cases filed before and after Wilson, see infra note 149.
109. See Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1412 (D. Minn. 1986) ("The
[c]ourt refuses to wreak subsequently imposed requirements on plaintiffs who did all that
was necessary to comply with the law applicable at the time their causes of action accrued
and were filed."); John Does 1-100 v. Ninneman, 634 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D. Minn. 1986)
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By applying Wilson prospectively, the court avoids the "brutal' 10
absurdity
of commanding a [person] today to do something yesterday. "
The ideal approach to the first prong of the Chevron analysis, then,
involves three steps. First, the court must consider whether the approach mandated by Wilson is actually novel. Next, the court must determine whether there is clear past precedent either for the particular tort
action alleged under section 1983, or for all section 1983 actions within
the state, and when that precedent became clear. If there was no clear
past precedent on which plaintiff could justifiably rely, the retroactivity
analysis should end here. Finally, if there is clear past precedent, the
court must determine, based on the date plaintiff filed her action,
whether justifiable reliance on the clear past precedent existed.
B.

The Second Chevron Prong: The Purpose Factor

The second prong of Chevron requires the court to examine the history, purpose and effect of the new rule to determine if retroactive application will "further or retard" operation of the new rule.I' Most courts
construing this factor do not give proper attention to the goals behind
section 1983.112 Rather, they look3 solely to the purposes mentioned in
one part of the Wilson decision."
1. The Purposes of Wilson v. Garcia
Wilson expressly states that the decision to apply uniformly the single
most appropriate statute of limitations in each state furthers federal interests in "uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary
litigation.""' 4 Wilson, however, was concerned with other interests as
well." 5 Indeed, the underlying reason the Court heard the case was to
("It would be harsh, injust and inequitable to now impose on plaintiff the responsibility to
have foreseen the reversal of that law three years later."). To support this position, these
courts rely on the reasoning in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971) ("It
would ... produce the most 'substantial inequitable results' to hold that the respondent
'slept on his rights' at a time when he could not have known the time limitation that the
law imposed upon him.") (citation omitted), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now
announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights.").
110. L. Fuller, The Morality of Laws 59 (1964).
111. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) ("[I]t has been stressed
that 'we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation
will further or retard its operation.' ") (citation omitted).
112. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
113. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (these purposes are "uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation").
114. Id.
115. See id. at 272 (the Court was also concerned with the "high purposes of this
unique remedy"). The Court specifically stated that "the conflict, confusion, and uncertainty concerning the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to this most important,
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further the federal interest in safeguarding federal civil rights. "6 The
Court characterized section 1983 as involving claims for personal injuries
in order to vindicate the interests protected by section 1983. " Thus, in
order to give full effect to the purposes of Wilson, it is necessary to analyze the purposes of section 1983.
2.

Purposes of Section 1983

Section 1983 provides a private individual with a civil cause of action
against any person who, under color of state law, has deprived or will
' 8
deprive the litigant of a federal constitutional or statutory right.
Although this statute does not afford any substantive rights," 9 it was
enacted in order to provide a remedy for the deprivation of constitutional
rights where state law is inadequate or "where the 12state
remedy, though
0
adequate in theory, [is] not available in practice."'
Section 1983 established the role of the federal government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power.' 2' Its purpose is to prevent state agents from violating the fourteenth amendment and certain
federal statutes and to compensate plaintiffs for deprivations of their federal rights. 122
3. Second Prong Applied
Most courts considering the retroactivity of Wilson determine that the
purpose factor is inconclusive. 23 Often these courts give no real basis for
and ubiquitous, civil rights statute provided compelling reasons for granting certiorari."
Id at 266.
116. Id at 279; see also Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1144 (7th Cir. 1986).
117. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279-80.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
119. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985) (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979)).
120. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v.
Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
121. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1985) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972)).
122. S.Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation § 1.03 at 4 (2d ed. 1986)
(citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)). See also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261.
276-79 (1985).
123. Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1412 n.12 (D. Minn. 1986); see. e.g.,
Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196
(3d Cir.), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Jackson v.City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652,
654-55 (10th Cir. 1984); Richard H. v.Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 581 (D. Minn.
1986); Bynum v. City of Pittsburg, 622 F. Supp. 196, 199 (N.D. Cal. 1985); de Furgalski
v. Siegel, 618 F. Supp. 295, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.
Supp. 461, 466 (D. Minn. 1985); Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 333 (N.D. III. 1985),
aff'd without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986).
At least one federal court of appeals, however, has held that the purpose factor favors
retroactivity. See Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 627-28 (11 th Cir. 1986). In
so holding, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concentrated primarily on the
purpose of uniformity. Id. This argument, however, can be rebutted. See Ridgway v.
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this conclusion but only state: "On balance, we cannot say that retro[active] application.., would either hamper or promote these goals"
of uniformity, certainty and minimization of unnecessary litigation., 2 4
Thus, the majority approach looks solely to the explicit interests of Wilson without proper consideration of the goals behind section 1983.125
When the purposes of section 1983 are considered, however, the pur27
pose factor is not inconclusive.1 26 The opinion in Anton v. Lehpamer ,
best demonstrates this proposition. In Anton, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit noted that when the Wilson interests of promoting
uniformity and reducing collateral litigation are the only interests considered, retroactive application neither promotes nor hampers these interests."2 " The Anton court then went beyond the interests of Wilson. It
noted that the Supreme Court, in safeguarding the rights of federal civil
rights litigants, expressed concern that the statutes of limitations applied
in section 1983 actions " 'fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by
[section] 1983.' "129
The Anton court concluded that the practical effect of using the twoyear personal injury statute of limitations mandated by Wilson, rather
than the five-year residual statute on which the plaintiff in Anton had
relied, would be to reduce the time period within which a plaintiff may
Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1986). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit stated:
Wilson merely promotes nationwide uniformity in deciding which of a state's
several statutes of limitations applies in section 1983 actions. It does not secure
nationwide uniformity as to the actual time within which such actions may be
filed, and retroactive application in the present case would not make any appreciable contribution to such uniformity.
Id. at 648. Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that "Wilson
simply mandates tht [sic] the same type of statute of limitations . . . will apply to all
section 1983 actions; it does not mandate a specific length of limitation." Anton v.
Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1145 (7th Cir. 1986). The Anton court, however, contrary to
the court in Ridgway, 795 F.2d at 648, determined that consideration of the interest of
uniformity alone yielded an inconclusive result. See Anton, 787 F.2d at 1145; see infra
text accompanying note 128.
124. Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 655 (10th Cir. 1984); accord Gibson
v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494
(U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 349 (1985); Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 333 (N.D. Ill.
1985), aff'd without opinion, 801 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986). Often, the only rationale
given to support this result is that the rule prior to Wilson served the policy goals articulated in Wilson. See Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634
F. Supp. 1402, 1411 (D. Minn. 1986).
125. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 627-28 (11th Cir. 1986);
Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 349
(1985); see supra note 123.
126. See, e.g., Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1145 (7th Cir. 1986); Stewart v.
Russell, 628 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
127. 787 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1986).
128. Id. at 1145.
129. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985)).
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commence a section 1983 action. 30 Therefore, total retroactive application of Wilson in cases such as the one before the court "would preclude
some plaintiffs from vindicating constitutional rights protected by section
1983 simply because the time for filing a suit had been reduced after the
3
cause of action accrued or ... after the litigation had begun."'1 1
According to the Anton court, because the Wilson interests of establishing uniformity and reducing litigation are not impaired by prospective application, 132 and "the [federal] interest of safeguarding the rights
33
of federal civil rights litigants is retarded34 by retroactive application,'
the purpose factor favors prospectivity.'
Because the Wilson decision was based on the vindication of federal
civil rights and involves more than the three interests considered by most
courts, 13 5 it is necessary to appraise the purposes of section 1983. More-

over, when the purposes of section 1983 are considered, the purpose factor will not yield "inconclusive" results. Rather, by adopting the method
used in Anton, a court will find, as to the purpose factor, that the federal
interests associated with section 1983 will be best served by prospective
application of Wilson.
C.

The Third Chevron Prong: The Inequity Factor

The third prong dictates that a court must weigh the inequity imposed
by retroactive application. 36 Chevron states that where a decision could
produce "substantial inequitable results" to the litigants if applied retroactively, courts should avoid "injustice or hardship" by applying the de13
cision prospectively.
130. Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1145 (7th Cir. 1986).
131. Id
132. Id.
133. Id (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
136. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971); Pratt v. Thornburgh, 807
F.2d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1986).
137. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971) (citation omitted). Most
courts that have considered the retroactivity of Wilson have found that the reliance and
inequity factors are so interrelated that they require almost the same analysis. See Ridgway v. Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1986); Fitzgerald v. Larson, 769
F.2d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1985); Stewart v. Russell, 628 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (S.D. Miss.
1986); Braderman v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 610 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (M.D.
Pa. 1985); Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176, 178 (C.D. I1. 1985).
In fact, in their analysis of the inequity factor, many courts refer to their previous
analysis of the reliance factor, thereby creating somewhat disjointed opinions. Eg., Ridgway v. Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1986); Williams v. City of Atlanta,
794 F.2d 624, 628 (11th Cir. 1986); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Stewart v. Russell, 628 F. Supp. 1361, 1365
(S.D. Miss. 1986); Braderman v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 610 F. Supp. 1069,
1072 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176, 178, 179 (C.D. I1. 1985).
The reason for the interrelationship is that where a court finds that there was no clear
past precedent on which plaintiff could justifiably rely, it usually follows that no substantial inequitable results will arise if the new rule is applied retroactively. Thus, in these
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1. Analysis When the Limitations Period is Abbreviated by
Retroactive Application of Wilson
Because the Chevron analysis does not specify plaintiff or defendant, 38
the court, in applying this factor, must balance the equities between the
plaintiff and the defendant. 139 In a retroactivity analysis of Wilson, however, courts are concerned primarily with the inequitable results to the
plaintiff" because, after Wilson, the statute of limitations is usually abbreviated.1 41 In most cases courts look at whether it would be inequitacases, where the first factor militates toward retroactivity, the third factor most often will
do the same. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1986);
Fitzgerald v. Larson, 769 F.2d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1985); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764
F.2d 188, 194-95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Braderman v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 610 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
The converse is also true: where a court finds that the plaintiff relied on clear past
precedent, it usually follows that substantial inequitable results will arise if the new rule is
applied retroactively. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971); Smith v.
City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 349 (1985); Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 655 (10th Cir. 1984); Stewart v. Russell, 628 F.
Supp. 1361, 1365 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
Only a few courts have found that the reliance factor favors prospectivity and that the
inequity factor favors retroactivity. See Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578 (D.
Minn. 1986); Gamel v. City of San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Cal. 1986). In those
cases the cause of action accrued before Wilson was decided but was filed after Wilson.
These courts reasoned that the plaintiff should have filed within a reasonable period after
the change in the law. Otherwise, the plaintiff would be "slumbering on her rights." See
supra note 107. For a further discussion of post-Wilson filings, see infra notes 146-179
and accompanying text.
A solution that eliminates this disorganization and aids in the comprehension of the
analysis by providing continuity is to consider the reliance factor first and the inequity
factor second since they are inherently related, and the purpose factor last.
138. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) ("[T]he decision to be applied
nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law ...by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ....")(emphasis added).
139. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676); Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d
1381, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1656 (1986).
140. See Ridgway v. Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1986); Anton v.
Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1986); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d
1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86676); Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 654-55 (10th Cir. 1984). But see Bartholomew v. Fischl, 782 F.2d 1148, 1155 (3d Cir. 1986) (case differs from most because
the defendants, rather than the plaintiff, sought to avoid retroactive application of the
Wilson decision); Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (same), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 1656 (1986); Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250, 1253 n.2 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 893 (1986).
141. See Loy v. Clamme, 804 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (from five
years to two years); Ridgway v. Wapello County, 795 F.2d 646, 647 (8th Cir. 1986) (from
five years to two years); Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1142 (7th Cir. 1986) (same);
Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1986) (from three years to one
year), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676); Jackson v. City
of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 653 (10th Cir. 1984) (from four years to three years);
Thompson v. County of Rock, 648 F. Supp. 861, 866 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (from six years to
three years). But see Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 546-49 (1st Cir. 1986)
(statute of limitations lengthened from two to six years in Maine); Rivera v. Green, 775
F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1656 (1986) (statute of limita-
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ble to hold that the plaintiff slept on her rights at a time when she could
not have known the time limitation the law imposed upon her. 4 Courts
consider that the plaintiff is foreclosed from her day in court for having
relied on past precedent,1 43 presuming, of course, that there was clear
past precedent.
Although consideration of fairness to the plaintiff is quite important, it
must be balanced against the consideration of fairness to the defendant.
Due to the frequent abbreviation of the statute of limitations, defendants
most often argue for a retroactive application of Wilson that bars plain144
tiff's claim.
tions lengthened from one to two years in Arizona); Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d
1250, 1253-56 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (statute of limitations lengthened from one to six years in
Alabama), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 893 (1986). In these cases, concern for the defendant
was outweighed by the importance of the § 1983 remedy. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. In some states, such as New York, limitations periods are likely to remain
unchanged. See, eg., Villante v. Department of Corrections of New York, 786 F.2d 516,
520 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986) (dicta stating that a three-year period would also apply post-Wilson); see supra note 97.
142. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971) ("It would ... produce the
most 'substantial inequitable results' to hold that the respondent 'slept on his rights' at a
time when he could not have known the time limitation that the law imposed upon
him.") (citation omitted); Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 655 (10th Cir.
1984) ("It would be most unjust to hold that plaintiffs have slept on their rights, based on
a change in the law occurring after their action was filed."); Cabrales v. County of Los
Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (it would be inequitable "to preclude
plaintiffs from filing their § 1983 claims by granting Wilson retroactive effect."); Gamel v.
City of San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("The result [of retroactive
application] could be different if the one year period had already passed by the time
Wilson was announced."); Ross v. Summers, 630 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
("[Tihis court ... must decline to apply Wilson n. Garcia retroactively to foreclose the
prosecution of the plaintiff's claims."); Stewart v. Russell, 628 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (S.D.
Miss. 1986) ("Thus, plaintiff's attorney cannot be charged with notice that the one-year
statute might be applied to bar this action and it is fundamentally unfair to hold him
responsible for anticipating the clear change in § 1983 law and analysis .. ")(emphasis
in original); Bailey v. Illinois, 622 F. Supp. 504, 509 (N.D. I1. 1985) ("[T]o apply [Wilson] to the present case would essentially rob [plaintiff] of her day in court ....
");Cook
v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F. Supp. 461, 466 (D. Minn. 1985) ("Such a result would be
unjust and would 'foreclose this Plaintiff from her day in court in regard to her complaint
under § 1983.' ") (quoting Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176, 179 (C.D. II1. 1985)).
143. Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 655 (10th Cir. 1984) ("We will not
bar plaintiffs' right to their day in court when their action was timely under the law in
effect at the time their suit was commenced."), cited with approval in, Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 266 n.10 (1985); Carpenter v. City of Fort Wayne, 637 F. Supp. 889, 896
(N.D. Ind. 1986) ("The Anton case suggests that a diligent plaintiff forced to lose his
claim because of the retroactive application of Wilson is subject to the type of inequity
which counsels against retroactive application."); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp.
1402, 1412 (D. Minn. 1986) ("To hold that plaintiff's lawsuit is retroactively time-barred
would have the effect of depriving plaintiff of any remedy whatsoever on the basis of a
'superceding legal doctrine that was quite unforeseeable.' ") (citation omitted).
144. E.g., Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626-27 (11 th Cir. 1986); Smith v.
City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 578-79 (D. Minn. 1986); Carpenter v. City of
Fort Wayne, 637 F. Supp. 889, 892-93 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Young v. Biggers, 630 F. Supp.
590, 592 (N.D. Miss. 1986). The rationale for defendants' argument here parallels the
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Although in many cases the defendant's position has not merited extended judicial discussion,' 4 5 the defendant's equities become more
purposes behind statutes of limitations. One such purpose is the policy of repose that
limits the periods within which actions may be brought and rights may be enforced. See
Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized FederalCommon Law: FederalRights of Action
and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 1011, 1016 (1980) ("While the statutory period is running, the possibility of litigation influences the activity of . . .[the]
parties. Once the statute has run, there is 'repose.' ") (footnotes omitted). See also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) ("In compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers
are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten."); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944) ("[T]he right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."). Another underlying rationale for statutes of limitations is notice. Timely notice promotes fair adjudication of disputes by advising defendants of the need to conserve evidence and witnesses required to
mount a defense. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321
U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). The Court in that case stated:
Statutes of limitation ... promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even
if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend
within the period of limitation ....
Id.
145. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Some courts, however, have taken the
defendants' position into consideration. For example, in Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F.
Supp. 1402 (D. Minn. 1986), the plaintiff had a post-filed claim and had been relying on a
six-year statute of limitations. Id. at 1406-I1. The plaintiff filed suit six months after
Wilson was decided, a little over three years after the cause of action accrued. Id. at 1413.
Citing Wilson, the defendants argued for retroactive application. Id. at 1406. In balancing the equities of the litigants, the court refused to "wreak subsequently imposed requirements" on plaintiffs who filed claims in accordance with the applicable law at the
time their causes of action accrued. Id. at 1412. The court determined that "[w]hile
prejudice to the defendants 'might occasionally result from the resurrection of a claim
once thought dead, it is not likely to equal the prejudice to the plaintiff resulting from the
unexpected death of a claim thought to be alive.' "Id. (quoting Barina v. Gulf Trading &
Transp. Co., 726 F.2d 560, 564 (9th Cir. 1984)).
The Ninth Circuit has also considered the defendants' position. See Gibson v. United
States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987)
(No. 86-676); Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1656 (1986). In Gibson, the court held that "when retroactive application would shorten
the statute of limitations, Wilson merits only prospective effect." 781 F.2d at 1339 (footnote omitted). Previously, the court of appeals had given retroactive effect to Wilson
when it had the effect of lengthening the limitations period. Rivera, 775 F.2d at 1384.
These holdings are not inconsistent when examined in light of the Ninth Circuit's policy of" 'advanc[ing] the litigant's ability to pursue section 1983 remedies at the expense
of a [disfavored] statute of limitations defense.'" Gibson, 781 F.2d at 1339 (quoting Rivera, 775 F.2d at 1384). In Gibson, it was determined that defendants were "not
prejudiced by enforcing the limitations rule prevailing at the time of their alleged wrongful acts." 781 F.2d at 1339. If Wilson were applied retroactively there, the defendants
would be given the windfall of a shorter statute of limitations and the use of the disfavored defense. See id. The court would then thwart the remedial purposes underlying
section 1983. Id.; see supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text. By contrast, the retroactive application of Wilson in Rivera provided the plaintiff with more time in which to
file suit. 775 F.2d at 1384; see also Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1419-20 (9th Cir.
1986) (following Rivera). The court reasoned that in the absence of substantial inequity
to the defendants, the interests of section 1983 were best served by retroactive application. Rivera, 775 F.2d at 1384.
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clearly pronounced when the plaintiff has filed after Wilson was decided.' 46 In these circumstances, the defendant's argument that she
should be afforded the general rule of retroactivity, which would bar the
plaintiff, is more persuasive than where the action was filed before Wilson
was decided. 147 In the latter, there was likely to have been at least some
time-consuming and costly litigation, and perhaps even a decision on the
merits.' 4 8 Clearly, where the cause of action was filed after Wilson was
decided, there was no such litigation and
reliance on clear past precedent
49
is more difficult for plaintiff to prove.1
146. See, e.g., Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 580-81 (D.Minn. 1986);
Gamel v. City of San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
147. The defendants' argument is usually more persuasive in cases filed after Wilson
because the plaintiff waited an unreasonably long time after Wilson to file suit. See. e.g.,
Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 580-81 (D.Minn. 1986); Gamel v. City of
San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1986). See also Sockman v. City of Erie,
645 F. Supp. 52, 55 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (plaintiff should have filed under the new, abbreviated statute of limitations in a timely fashion).
148. See, eg., Loy v. Clamme, 804 F.2d 405, 406-08 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (two
years of discovery, summary judgment and appeal); Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141,
1145 (7th Cir. 1986) (four and one-half years of litigation including discovery and many
motions for summary judgment, one of which was ultimately granted by the district
court); Hobson v. Brennan, 625 F. Supp. 459, 469-70 (D.D.C. 1985) (nine years of litigation and a seventeen day jury trial on the merits with verdict for plaintiffs). See also
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971) (the Court found that it would serve
no congressional purpose "[t]o abruptly terminate [a] lawsuit that [had] proceeded
through lengthy and, no doubt, costly discovery stages for a year"). But see Smith v.
City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir.) (the purpose of Wilson "would be served
by applying the two-year statute of limitations to all plaintiffs, whether or not their claims
are already in litigation, if the other Chevron factors favor such a result"), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 349 (1985).
149. The reason for the difficulty in showing reliance where the plaintiff filed after
Wilson is that courts apparently believe that filing before Wilson, within the time period
prevailing when the cause of action arose, is the best evidence of reliance. See, e.g., Arvidson v. City of Mankato, 635 F. Supp. 112, 113 (D. Minn. 1986) ("Plaintiffs have not
shown any greater reliance interest ....They filed this action after Wilson Y.Garcia was
decided ....");Young v. Biggers, 630 F. Supp. 590, 592 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (if it was
reasonable for a plaintiff to delay filing suit under the former rule, "itwould be unjust to
hold that this plaintiff has slept on his rights based on a change in the law occurring after
his action was filed. We find that there exists no such injustice here... [because] Wilson
was decided before Young filed his claim.... .") (footnote omitted). If the plaintiff has a
difficult time proving reliance, she will also have a more difficult task of demonstrating
that there will be substantial inequitable results if Wilson is given retroactive application.
See supra note 137.
Chevron, however, can also be interpreted as expressing concerns about protecting the
reliance of litigants on an existing limitations rule when they contemplate filing suit.
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971). The Court stated that:
When the respondent was injured, for the next two years until he instituted his
lawsuit, and for the ensuing year of pretrial proceedings, these [past] decisions
represented the law governing his case. It cannot be assumed that he did or
could foresee that this consistent interpretation of the [law governing the case]
would be overturned. The most he could do was to rely on the law as it then
was.
Id See also Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir.) ("Where a plaintiff
could have reasonably waited to file suit under the established prior rule, it would be
inequitable to say he had slept on his rights because of a later and unforeseeable Supreme
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Although defendant's equities should always be considered, in the particularly difficult situation in which retroactive application takes away a
plaintiff's cause of action, 50 the plaintiff's equities carry more weight. 5 '
Statutes of limitations are premised on a plaintiff being afforded a full
opportunity to her day in court. 5 2 Denying the plaintiff such an opportunity is not only inconsistent with this premise,' 5 3 but also contrary to
It is an inappropriate attempt to extinthe purposes of section 11983.154
55
guish rights arbitrarily.
A better argument considers the policy of repose, 56 on which statutes
of limitations are based and as defined by the arbitrary time limits imposed by the legislature.1 57 Because the defendant knew at the time the
cause of action arose which time limit applied and thus when she could
rest, she is not prejudiced if that time limit is ultimately imposed. 5 1

In order to balance both litigants' equities, some courts have imposed
Wilson retroactively but have also allowed a reasonable grace period after
Wilson in which to file a cause of action.1 59 These courts correctly recognize that a plaintiff who justifiably relied on the old statute of limitations
must be given a reasonable time following the change in the law in which
Court decision.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 349 (1985); Bailey v. Illinois,
622 F. Supp. 504, 509 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (argument can be made that reliance includes time
period when plaintiff contemplated filing suit).
150. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
151. See Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(court placed great emphasis on the fact that plaintiff's claims would be immediately
extinguished if Wilson was applied retroactively); Carpenter v. City of Fort Wayne, 637
F. Supp. 889, 896 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ("The Anton case suggests that a diligent plaintiff
forced to lose his claim because of the retroactive application of Wilson is subject to the
type of inequity which counsels against retroactive application."); Gamel v. City of San
Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("The result [retroactive application]
could be different if the one year period had already passed by the time Wilson was announced. In that case, the Court might allow plaintiff a reasonable time to file suit after
the decision."); Ross v. Summers, 630 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (court emphasized that plaintiff would be foreclosed if Wilson was given retroactive effect); Bailey
v. Illinois, 622 F. Supp. 504, 509 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (same); Cook v. City of Minneapolis,
617 F. Supp. 461, 466 (D. Minn. 1985) (same); Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176, 179
(C.D. Ill. 1985) (same).
152. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902)).
153. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902).
154. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 144.
157. Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1986).
158. See Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676) ("The defendants are not prejudiced by
enforcing the limitations rule prevailing at the time of their alleged wrongful acts.").
159. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 & n.4 (C.D. Cal.
1986); Fasanelle v. Elrod, 635 F. Supp. 531, 533-34 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1413 (D. Minn. 1986); Wegrzyn v. Illinois Dep't of Children and
1986); Shorters v. City of Chicago, 617 F.
Family Servs., 627 F. Supp. 636, 641 (C.D. I11.
Supp. 661, 667-68 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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to file suit."6 Legislation that has the effect of cutting off existing rights
by shortening limitations periods is constitutional provided that a reasonable time is allowed to file suit. 6 ' When a court changes the limitations
period, this does not eliminate the requirement that a reasonable period
be provided.16 2 Because this period of adjustment is neither totally retroactive nor totally prospective, 6 3 and because it inherently takes both litigants' positions into account, it should be afforded to plaintiffs whose
causes of action would be time-barred by retroactive application of the
new rule.64
Although some courts have determined that a reasonable grace period
is necessary, they disagree about its length. 16 1 Courts also disagree on
the date from which the reasonable period after the Wilson decision
should be measured-the date of the Wilson decision, or the date of a
decision within the state1 66
resolving the appropriate statute of limitations
as mandated by Wilson.

The approach of the Seventh Circuit in Anton provides a workable
solution. The Anton court recognized the tension between the plaintiff's
equity argument for prospective application, and the implementation of
160. See supra note 159.
161. "This court has often decided that [changes in] statutes of limitation affecting
existing rights are not unconstitutional, if a reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect." Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632-33
(1877). See also Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 527 n.21 (citing Terry); Wilson v.
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63 (1982) (same).
162. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 527 n.21 (1982); accord Cabrales v. County of
Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F.
Supp. 1402, 1413 (D. Minn. 1986); Shorters v. City of Chicago, 617 F. Supp. 661, 668
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
163. See Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1146 (7th Cir. 1986) (partial retroactive
application); Scherer v. Balkema, No. 79-C-3686, slip op. at 14 (N.D. 111. Dec. 1I, 1986)
(same); Urdiales v. Kondal, No. 85-C-7691, slip op. at 4 (N.D. I11.June 4, 1986) (same).
See also Confusion in Federal Courts, supra note 37, at 127 (labeling this approach the
"Prospective-Prospective Method").
164. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
165. Compare Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (up to one year is the reasonable period) and Fasanelle v. Elrod, 635 F. Supp. 531,
533-34 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (filing seven months post-Wilson is not unreasonable) and Chris
N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1413 (D. Minn. 1986) (filing almost six months postWilson is reasonable) and Wegrzyn v. Illinois Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 627
F. Supp. 636, 640-41 (C.D. Il1.1986) (filing four months after Wilson is reasonable) and
Shorters v. City of Chicago, 617 F. Supp. 661, 667-68 (N.D. I11.1985) (filing seventy-five
days after Wilson is not unreasonable) with Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578,
581 (D. Minn. 1986) (filing almost nine months following Wilson is unreasonable) and
Gamel v. City of San Francisco, 633 F. Supp. 48, 49-50 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (filing eight
months after Wilson is unreasonable).
166. Compare Richard H. v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 581 (D. Minn. 1986) (the
reasonable period should be measured from the date Wilson was decided) ivith Chris N. v.
Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1413 n.15 (D. Minn. 1986) (the reasonable period should
be measured from the point where the plaintiff is on notice that a particular statute of
limitations is to be applied, i.e., from a decision specifying which statute of limitations
after Wilson is appropriate).
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led the
the Wilson decision as quickly as justice permits.' 6 7 This tension
168
court to formulate a rule of "partial retroactive application."'
The plaintiff in Anton relying on the clear precedent of a five-year
residual statute of limitations, filed two years and one month after his
cause of action accrued. 169 The new statute of limitations mandated by
Wilson provided for a two-year prescriptive period. 7 ° Consequently, if
Wilson were applied retroactively, the plaintiff would be time-barred. 17 1
Although the plaintiff in Anton filed before Wilson was decided, the
court formulated a rule for use in Illinois for cases filed both before and
after the Wilson decision.1 7 ' The plaintiff must file suit either five years
from the date her cause of action accrued or two years after the date
Wilson was decided, whichever is shorter. 17 In Anton, this approach
74
gave the litigants and the courts two years to adjust to the new rule.'
Thus, according to Anton, an approach now adopted for all states in
the Seventh Circuit 1 75 and by the District Court for the Central District
of California, 176 the new period of limitations mandated by Wilson becomes the maximum period for adjustment.1 77 Although the plaintiff is
not afforded the old rule in its entirety when the Anton approach is applied, she still benefits from it to the extent that she had the time period
before Wilson in which to file her claim, as well as a reasonable time,
167. Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Scherer v.
Balkema, No. 79-C-3686, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 1986); Urdiales v. Kondal,
No. 85-C-7691, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1986).
168. Anton, 787 F.2d at 1146.
169. Id. at 1145.
170. Id. at 1142.
171. Id. at 1145-46.
172. Id. at 1146; see also Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1356
(C.D. Cal. 1986) ("In reaching its decision, the [Anton] court also took account of the
problem of pre-accrued claims [filed after Wilson].").
173. Anton, 787 F.2d at 1146 ("[I]n Illinois, a plaintiff whose section 1983 cause of
action accrued before the Wilson decision, April 17, 1985, must file suit within the shorter
period of either five years from the date his action accrued or two years after Wilson.")
(footnote omitted).
174. Id.;see Urdiales v. Kondal, No. 85-C-7691, slip op. at 4 (N.D. 111. June 14, 1986).
175. Loy v. Clamme, 804 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (Indiana); Anton v.
Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1986) (Illinois); Thompson v. County of Rock, 648 F.
Supp. 861 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (Wisconsin).
176. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
Instead of employing the former three-year statute of limitations as used in Gibson v.
United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan.
20, 1987) (No. 86-676) (see supra note 145), the court determined that a plaintiff with a
post-filed claim has the shorter period of either three years from the date his cause of
action accrued or one year after Wilson to file suit. Cabrales, 644 F. Supp. at 1356.
177. See Anton, 787 F.2d at 1146; Urdiales v. Kondal, No. 85-C-7691, slip op. at 4
(N.D. Ill. June 3, 1986). For example, suppose that past precedent called for a five-year
statute of limitations and the new period mandated by Wilson is two years. If the cause
of action accrued on or after April 17, 1983 and until April 16, 1985, the plaintiff will
have until two years post-Wilson, or until April 17, 1987, to file suit. See Cabrales v.
County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986) ("[P]laintiffs would be
granted the new statutory ...period, measured from the date of the Wilson decision, to
file their claims.").
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following Wilson, in which to adjust to the new rule. The defendant's
interests are also served since the plaintiff is not afforded the old rule in
its entirety through purely prospective application.
Similarly, plaintiffs whose claims were near expiration under the former statute of limitations at the time Wilson was decided would not be
granted any additional time beyond that period." 8 Accordingly, the Anton approach to the third Chevron prong is the "most just and certain
79
method" since it balances the interests of both litigants.1
Where clear past precedent induced reliance on a longer statute of limitations, the Anton approach is laudable because it provides the uniformity, certainty and reduction of collateral litigation sought by Wilson."W
It eliminates the difficult task of determining a reasonable period of time
in which a plaintiff should file suit after Wilson was decided, a task that
inherently leads to inconsistent results.' 8' The approach also serves the
interests of the judicial system by creating a formula which can be applied fairly to all litigants. 8 2 In the contemporary world of overloaded
dockets, the courts, under the Anton approach, no longer need to decide
questions of retroactivity and of reasonable periods. Rather, they can
apply the formula created by the Anton court,' 8 3 thereby reducing burdensome collateral litigation.
2. Analysis When the Limitations Period is Lengthened by
Retroactive Application of Wilson
Where there was clear past precedent but the prescriptive period is
lengthened by applying the new statute of limitations retroactively, providing more time for plaintiffs to file suit, the rule developed by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be followed.'8 4 The Ninth Cir178. See Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (C.D. Cal.
1986).
179. Id.
180. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
("The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit and adopted by this Court serves" the
purposes of Wilson). For the purposes of Wilson, see supra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 175-77.
183. See, eg., Scherer v. Balkema, No. 79-C-3686, slip op. at 14 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11,
1986); Sechovec v. Village of Round Lake Heights, No. 86-C-2114, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 4, 1986); Doulin v. City of Chicago, No. 82-C-6771, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Il. Aug. 25,
1986); Photos v. Township High School Dist. No. 211, 639 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Benegas v. Cardin, No. 85-C-8492, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1986); Alvarez
v. City of Chicago, 633 F. Supp. 1361, 1362-63 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Hobbs v. White, No. 85C-7997, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 1986).
184. Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1656
(1986); see also Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1986) (following Rivera).
The Anton formula is inapplicable where the statute of limitations is lengthened if Wilson is applied retroactively. For example, suppose the old statute gave one year to file suit
and the new period mandated by Wilson is two years. If the Anton approach were to be
applied, the plaintiff would have the shorter of the one-year or the two-year period in
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cuit has a policy of "advanc[ing] the litigant's ability to pursue section
1983 remedies" whenever possible.'8 5
In a line of cases, the Ninth Circuit has developed an approach that
recognizes strong equities favoring the general rule of retroactive application where the statute of limitations is lengthened. 8 6 At first glance, this
result seems glaringly unjust to the defendant because the plaintiff filed
after the old limitations period ran, then attempted a retroactive application of Wilson to revive what was essentially a "stale" claim. 8 7 It is
consistent, however, with the importance of access to the courts for section 1983 litigants'8 8 and the disfavored nature of the statute of limitations defense. 8 9 Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn from this line of
cases is that the defendant will be prejudiced less if the longer prescriptive period applies to the cause of action than the plaintiff would be
prejudiced if she was only afforded the shorter statute of limitations.
3.

Summary of the Inequity Factor

In order to apply the inequity factor of the Chevron analysis properly,
the court must consider the equities of both the plaintiff and the defendant. These equities shift depending on when the cause of action was filed.
While the defendant's equities are more pronounced where the claim was
filed after the Wilson decision, when the cause of action is lost entirely by
retroactive application of the new rule, the plaintiff should be afforded a
reasonable period of time after Wilson in which to file suit.
The Anton approach, using the new statute of limitations period mandated by Wilson as a period of adjustment, provides an equitable and
workable formula to deal with these competing considerations. It also
serves the interests of the judicial system. Where retroactive application
which to file suit. Thus, in effect, she would always have the old (here one-year) period
only.
One of the purposes of the Anton formula is to give a reasonable period of adjustment
by the use of a partial retroactive approach. In the above hypothetical, Wilson will always be given complete prospective effect but the plaintiff will not be afforded any of the
benefits of the new rule-one of the goals behind the doctrine of prospectivity. See supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
185. Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1656
(1986); see supra note 145.
186. Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1656
(1986); see also Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1986) (following Rivera). See supra note 145.
187. Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1382 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1656
(1986) (Rivera filed in federal court one and one half years after his cause of action accrued, yet the former statute of limitations was one year); see also Small v. Inhabitants of
Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 549 n.6 (Ist Cir. 1986).
188. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676); Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1656 (1986).
189. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-676); Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1656 (1986).
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of Wilson would lengthen the statute of limitations, this approach is inapplicable. In this situation, retroactive application of Wilson is most
appropriate.
CONCLUSION

In order to give similar treatment to all section 1983 litigants, a uniform analysis of the Chevron retroactivity test to the new rule set forth in
Wilson v. Garcia, concerning the appropriate statute of limitations in section 1983 actions, is required. One method that eliminates some of the
disorganization and provides continuity is to consider the reliance factor
first and the equity factor second since they are inherently interrelated,
and the purpose factor last.1 90
Regardless of the order of examination, the ideal analysis of the reliance factor involves three steps. 19' First, the court must consider
whether the approach mandated by Wilson is actually novel. Next, the
court must determine if and when there is clear past precedent concerning the appropriate statute of limitations, either for the particular tort
action alleged under section 1983, or for all section 1983 actions within
the state. Finally, the court must determine whether the plaintiff was
justified in relying on the precedent. The ease with which this determination is made, however, also depends on whether there was uniform precedent for all section 1983 actions within the state, or whether the
precedent within the state was tort-specific. If the court finds that there
is no clear past precedent, the analysis should end here.
With respect to the purpose factor,19 in addition to the interests of
promoting uniformity and reducing collateral litigation, courts must give
proper attention to the goal of safeguarding the rights of federal civil
rights litigants. When courts do so, the purpose factor will not yield
inconclusive results.
When analyzing the equity factor of the Chevron test, the court must
consider the equities of both the plaintiff and the defendant. ' 93 In order
to balance these equities properly, the court must examine when the
cause of action accrued and when it was filed. In most cases, courts find
that the defendant's equities are more pronounced where the claim was
filed after Wilson was decided. Where the cause of action is time-barred
due to retroactive application of the new rule, however, the plaintiff
should be afforded a reasonable time period after the Wilson decision in
94
which to file suit.'
The ideal approach laid down in Anton illustrates that the new statute
of limitations mandated by Wilson becomes this reasonable time period,
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See supra note 137.
See supra notes 82-110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 111-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 143, 150-66 and accompanying text.
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allowing both the litigants and the courts to adjust to the new rule. 95
Thus, Anton applies where the new statute of limitations mandated by
Wilson is shorter than that formerly used. It provides an equitable and
practical formula to deal with the competing considerations of safeguarding the rights of federal civil rights litigants, and implementing Wilson as
quickly as justice permits. This approach is not applicable in the unusual
cases where the new statute of limitations is lengthened. In these cases,
Wilson should be applied retroactively, thus advancing a plaintiff's ability to pursue her section 1983 remedy.' 9 6
Staci M. Berman
195. See supra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.

